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Abstract—Smart contract technology is reshaping conventional
industry and business processes. Being embedded in blockchains,
smart contracts enable the contractual terms of an agreement
to be enforced automatically without the intervention of a
trusted third party. As a result, smart contracts can cut down
administration and save services costs, improve the efficiency
of business processes and reduce the risks. Although smart
contracts are promising to drive the new wave of innovation
in business processes, there are a number of challenges to be
tackled. This paper presents a survey on smart contracts. We first
introduce blockchains and smart contracts. We then present the
challenges in smart contracts as well as recent technical advances.
We also compare typical smart contract platforms and give a
categorization of smart contract applications along with some
representative examples.
Index Terms—Smart contract; Blockchain; Cryptocurrency;
Decentralization
I. INTRODUCTION
Blockchain technology has recently fueled extensive in-
terests from both academia and industry. A blockchain is
a distributed software system allowing transactions to be
processed without the necessity of a trusted third party. As a
result, business activities can be completed in an inexpensive
and quick manner. Moreover, the immutability of blockchains
also assures the distributed trust since it is nearly impossible
to tamper any transactions stored in blockchains and all the
historical transactions are auditable and traceable.
Blockchain technology is enabling smart contracts that
were first proposed in 1990s by Nick Szabo [1]. In a smart
contract, contract clauses written in computer programs will
be automatically executed when predefined conditions are
met. Smart contracts consisting of transactions are essentially
stored, replicated and updated in distributed blockchains. In
contrast, conventional contracts need to be completed by
a trusted third party in a centralized manner consequently
resulting in long execution time and extra cost. The integration
of blockchain technology with smart contracts will make the
dream of a “peer-to-peer market” come true.
Take a smart contract between a buyer and a supplier as
an example. As shown in Figure 1, a supplier first sends a
product catalog to a buyer through the blockchain network.
This catalog that includes product descriptions (such as prop-
erty, quantity, price and availability) along with shipping and
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Figure 1. An example of a smart contract between a buyer and
a supplier.
payment terms is stored and distributed in the blockchain so
that a buyer can obtain the product information and verify the
authenticity and reputation of the supplier at the same time.
The buyer then submits the order with the specified quantity
and payment date via the blockchain. This whole procedure
forms a purchase contract (i.e., Contract 1) enclosed in the
blue box as shown in Figure 1. It is worth mentioning that
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2the whole procedure is completed between the buyer and the
supplier without the intervention of a third party.
After Contract 1 is done, the supplier will search for a
carrier in the blockchain to complete the shipping phase. Like
Contract 1, the carrier also publishes the shipping description
(such as transportation fees, source, destination, capacity and
shipping time) as well as shipping conditions and terms in
the blockchain. If the supplier accepts the contract issued by
the carrier, the products will be delivered to the carrier who
will finally dispatch the products to the buyer. This whole
procedure constructs Contract 2 (enclosed in the pink box) as
shown in Figure 1 . Similarly, the whole procedure of Contract
2 is also conducted without the intervention of a third party.
In addition to automatic execution of Contract 1 and Con-
tract 2, the payment procedures (including the payment from
the supplier to the carrier and that from the buyer to the
supplier) are also completed automatically. For example, once
the buyer confirms the reception of the products, the payment
between the buyer and the supplier will be automatically
triggered as the predefined condition is met. The financial
settlement from the buyer to the supplier is conducted via
crypto currencies (e.g., Bitcoin or Ether1.). In contrast to
conventional transactions, the whole process is done in a peer-
to-peer manner without the intervention of third parties like
banks. As a result, the turnaround time and transactional cost
can be greatly saved.
In summary, smart contracts have the following advantages
compared with conventional contracts:
• Reducing risks. Due to the immutability of blockchains,
smart contracts cannot be arbitrarily altered once they are
issued. Moreover, all the transactions that are stored and
duplicated throughout the whole distributed blockchain
system are traceable and auditable. As a result, malicious
behaviors like financial frauds can be greatly mitigated.
• Cutting down administration and service costs. Block-
chains assure the trust of the whole system by dis-
tributed consensus mechanisms without going through a
central broker or a mediator. Smart contracts stored in
blockchains can be automatically triggered in a decentral-
ized way. Consequently, the administration and services
costs due to the intervention from the third party can be
significantly saved.
• Improving the efficiency of business processes. The elim-
ination of the dependence on the intermediary can sig-
nificantly improve the efficiency of business process.
Take the aforementioned supply-chain procedure as an
example. The financial settlement will be automatically
completed in a peer-to-peer manner once the predefined
condition is met (e.g., the buyer confirms the reception
of the products). As a result, the turnaround time can be
significantly reduced.
Smart contracts are boosting a broad spectrum of appli-
cations ranging from industrial Internet of Things to financial
services [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11]. Although
smart contracts have great potentials to reshape conventional
business procedures, there are a number of challenges to
1Commonly used acronyms in this paper are listed in Table I
Table I. Acronym Table
Terms Acronyms
Proof of Work PoW
Proof of Stake PoS
Practical Byzantine-Fault Tolerance PBFT
Low Level Virtual Machine LLVM
Convolutional Neural Network CNN
Long Short Term Memory LSTM
Ether ETH
Bitcoin BTC
Ethereum Virtual Machine EVM
Unspent Transaction Output UTXO
Internet of Things IoT
Distributed Autonomous Corporation DAC
Certificate Authority CA
Delegated Proof of Stake DPOS
WebAssembly Wasm
Border Gateway Protocol BGP
be solved. For example, even if blockchains can assure a
certain anonymity of the parties of the contract, the privacy
of the whole contract execution may not be preserved since
all the transactions are globally available. Moreover, it is
challenging to ensure the correctness of smart contracts due to
vulnerabilities of computer programs to the faults and failures.
There are some recent studies on smart contracts. For
example, [12], [13], [14] present comprehensive surveys of
blockchain technology and briefly introduce smart contracts.
The work of [15] provides an in-depth survey on Ethereum
smart contract programming vulnerabilities while [17] presents
a detailed survey over verification methods on smart contract
languages. The work of [16] reports authors’ experiences in
teaching smart contract programming and summarizes several
typical types of mistakes made by students. Ref. [18] presents
an empirical analysis on smart contract platforms. Recent
studies [19], [20] also collect some literature of smart contracts
and present reviews while fail to discuss the challenges in this
area. Moreover, the work of [21] presents a brief overview of
smart contract platforms and architectures. However, most of
existing papers fail to identify the rising challenges and give
a comprehensive survey. For example, Ethereum can be used
to conduct illegal business such as Ponzi schemes that were
reported to defraud over 410,000 US dollars while few studies
address this issue [22]. We summarize the differences between
this paper and existing studies in Table II.
The objective of this paper is to conduct a systematic
overview of technical challenges in smart contracts enabled
by blockchain technologies. Contributions of this paper are
highlighted as following:
• Important research challenges in the life cycle of smart
contracts are identified.
• Recent advances in addressing technical challenges are
summarized.
3Table II. Comparison with related work
Research Ethereum Other
platforms
Programming
Languages
Other technical
challenges
Technical
advances
Rising
challenges
Applications
[12], [13], [14] X 7 7 7 7 7 7
[15], [16] X 7 X 7 7 7 7
[17] X X X 7 7 7 7
[18] X X X 7 7 7 X
[19], [20], [21] X X X X X 7 X
This paper X X X X X X X
• A detailed comparison of typical smart contract platforms
is made.
• Diverse smart contract applications are summarized.
Organization of this paper. Section II gives a brief
introduction to blockchains and smart contracts. Section III
then summarizes research challenges in smart contracts as well
as recent technical advances. Section IV next compares typical
smart contract development platforms. Section V categorizes
typical smart contract applications. Finally, Section VI con-
cludes the paper.
II. OVERVIEW OF BLOCKCHAIN AND SMART CONTRACT
Smart contracts are built upon blockchain technology en-
suring the correct execution of the contracts. We first provide
a brief introduction to blockchain technology in Section II-A.
We then give an overview on smart contracts in Section II-B.
A. Blockchain
A blockchain can be regarded as a public ledger, in which all
transactions cannot be falsified. Figure 2 illustrates an example
of a blockchain. A blockchain is a continuously-growing chain
of blocks. When a new block is generated, all the nodes in
the network will participate in validating the block. Once the
block is validated, it will be appended to the blockchain.
To validate the trustfulness of blocks, consensus algorithms
are developed. Consensus algorithms determine which node to
store the next block and how the new appended block to be
validated by other nodes. Representative consensus algorithms
include proof of work (PoW) [23] and proof of stake (PoS)
and practical byzantine-fault tolerance (PBFT) [24], [25].
Consensus algorithms are usually done by users who first solve
the puzzle (i.e., PoW or PoS). These users are called miners.
Each miner keeps a full copy of the blockchain. Different from
PoW and PoS, PBFT requires a multi-round voting process to
reach the consensus. The distributed consensus algorithms can
ensure that transactions are done without the intervention of
third parties like banks. As a result, the transaction costs can
be saved. Moreover, users transact with their virtual addresses
instead of real identities so that the privacy of users is also
preserved.
In blockchain systems, it is possible that several nodes can
successfully reach the consensus (i.e., solving the puzzle) at
the same time, consequently it can cause the bisected branches.
To solve the disparity, a shorted side chain is desolated as
shown in Figure 2 while the longest chain is selected as the
valid chain. This mechanism is effective since the longer chain
is more tolerant to malicious attacks than the shorter chain in
distributed systems.
In summary, blockchain technology has the key characteris-
tics of decentralization, immutable, persistency and anonymity
[26], [27], [28].
B. Smart Contract
Smart contracts can be regarded as a great advance in
blockchain technology [29]. In 1990s, a smart contract was
proposed as a computerized transaction protocol that executes
the contractual terms of an agreement [1]. Contractual clauses
that are embedded in smart contracts will be enforced auto-
matically when a certain condition is satisfied (e.g., one party
who breaches the contract will be punished automatically).
Blockchains are enabling smart contracts. Smart contracts
are essentially implemented on top of blockchains. The ap-
proved contractual clauses are converted into executable com-
puter programs. The logical connections between contractual
clauses have also been preserved in the form of logical
flows in programs (e.g., the if-else-if statement). The
execution of each contract statement is recorded as an im-
mutable transaction stored in the blockchain. Smart contracts
guarantee appropriate access control and contract enforcement.
In particular, developers can assign access permission for
each function in the contract. Once any condition in a smart
contract is satisfied, the triggered statement will automatically
execute the corresponding function in a predictable manner.
For example, Alice and Bob agree on the penalty of violating
the contract. If Bob breaches the contract, the corresponding
penalty (as specified in the contract) will be automatically paid
(deducted) from Bob’s deposit.
The whole life cycle of smart contracts consists of four
consecutive phases as illustrated in Figure 3:
1) Creation of smart contracts. Several involved parties first
negotiate on the obligations, rights and prohibitions on
contracts. After multiple rounds of discussions and nego-
tiations, an agreement can reach. Lawyers or counselors
will help parties to draft an initial contractual agree-
ment. Software engineers then convert this agreement
written in natural languages into a smart contract written
in computer languages including declarative languages
and logic-based rule languages [30]. Similar to the
development of computer software, the procedure of
the smart contract conversion is composed of design,
implementation and validation (i.e., testing). It is worth
mentioning that the creation of smart contracts is an
iterative process involving with multiple rounds of ne-
gotiations and iterations. Meanwhile, it is also involved
with multiple parties, such as stakeholders, lawyers and
software engineers.
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Figure 2. A blockchain consists of a sequence of blocks, each of which contains an inverse hash pointing back to its parent
block. Meanwhile, there are a number of transactions stored inside a block.
2) Deployment of smart contracts. The validated smart
contracts can then be deployed to platforms on top of
blockchains. Contracts stored on the blockchains cannot
be modified due to the immutability of block-chains.
Any emendation requires the creation of a new contract.
Once smart contracts are deployed on blockchains,
all the parties can access the contracts through the
blockchains. Moreover, digital assets of both involved
parties in the smart contract are locked via freezing the
corresponding digital wallets [31]. For example, the coin
transfers (either incoming or outgoing) on the wallets
relevant to the contract are blocked. Meanwhile, the
parties can be identified by their digital wallets.
3) Execution of smart contracts. After the deployment
of smart contracts, the contractual clauses have been
monitored and evaluated. Once the contractual con-
ditions reach (e.g., product reception), the contractual
procedures (or functions) will be automatically executed.
It is worth noting that a smart contract consists of a
number of declarative statements with logical connec-
tions. When a condition is triggered, the corresponding
statement will be automatically executed, consequently
a transaction being executed and validated by miners in
the blockchains [32]. The committed transactions and
the updated states have been stored on the blockchains
thereafter.
4) Completion of smart contracts. After a smart contract
has been executed, new states of all involved parties are
updated. Accordingly, the transactions during the execu-
tion of the smart contracts as well as the updated states
are stored in blockchains. Meanwhile, the digital assets
have been transferred from one party to another party
(e.g., money transfer from the buyer to the supplier).
Consequently, digital assets of involved parties have
been unlocked. The smart contract then has completed
the whole life cycle.
It is worth mentioning that during deployment, execution
and completion of a smart contract, a sequence of transactions
has been executed (each corresponding to a statement in the
smart contract) and stored in the blockchain. Therefore, all
these three phases need to write data to the blockchain as
shown in Figure 3.
III. CHALLENGES AND ADVANCES OF SMART CONTRACT
Although a smart contract is a promising technology, there
are still a number of challenges to be tackled. We categorize
these major challenges into four types according to four phases
of the life cycle of smart contracts. Meanwhile, we also give
an overview on recent advances in solving these challenges.
Table III summarizes the challenges and recent advances.
A. Creation challenges
Contract creation is an important step to implement smart
contracts. Users have to code their own contracts and then
deploy them in various blockchain platforms (to be introduced
in Section IV). Since blockchains are essentially immutable,
blockchain-based smart contracts also cannot be modified after
being deployed. As a result, developers need to carefully
address the following problems.
1) Readability: Most of smart contracts are written in
programming languages such as Solidity, Go, Kotlin and
Java (to be described in Section IV). Then source codes
will be compiled and executed. Therefore, in different time
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Figure 3. A life cycle of a smart contract consists of four major phases: Creation, Deployment, Execution and Completion
periods, programs have different forms of codes. How to make
programs readable in each form remains a big challenge.
Recent advances for readability challenge
• Recover source code: It is shown in [33] that more than
77% smart contracts have not released public source
codes, all of which are involved with over $3 billion
US dollars. Unavailability of source code makes smart
contract be opaque to the official auditors. To address this
issue, [33] proposed a reverse engineering tool (namely
Erays) to analyze compiled smart contracts. This reverse
engineering tool is able to convert hex encoded contract
into a human readable pseudo codes.
• Human readable code: Frantz and Nowostawski [34] pro-
posed a semi-automated translation system that can con-
vert human-readable contract representations into compu-
tational programs. Essentially, this semi-automated trans-
lation system has been implemented according to the
concept from institutional analysis [80]. In particular,
institution specifications can be decomposed into different
components such as attributes, deontic, aim,
conditions and or else. These components are
then mapped into the corresponding blocks written in
programming languages. For example, the attributes
can be converted into structs in Solidity. Since most
of smart contract programming languages are object-
oriented languages, [35] argues that declarative language
backed by a logic programming computational model
might be more suitable for smart contract. For example,
the authors claim that Prolog (a type of logic language)
does not requires compilation so it also avoids the in-
spection on smart contract compilation.
• Human readable execution: Although many platforms
attempt to provide smart contract developers with high
level languages, these smart contracts will then be com-
piled into other forms, e.g., bytecode in Ethereum Virtual
Machine (EVM). In most of cases, two parties in the
transaction need to understand the contracts at the level
that it has been stored and executed on blockchain.
Ref. [36] proposed an intermediate level language named
IELE to solve this challenge. IELE has a similar syntax to
Low Level Virtual Machine (LLVM) [37] so as to provide
compilers with high-level information during the compile
time, link time, run time, and idle time.
2) Functional issues: There are a number of functional
issues with incumbent smart contract platforms. We present
several representative challenges: 1) Re-entrancy means that
the interrupted function can be safely recalled again. Ma-
licious users may exploit this vulnerability to steal digital
currency as indicated in [81]. 2) Block randomness. Some
smart contract applications such as lotteries and betting pools
may require randomness of generated blocks. This can be
achieved by generating pseudo-random numbers in a block
timestamp or nonce. However, some malicious miners may
fabricate some blocks to deviate from the outcome of the
pseudo-random generator. In this way, attackers can control
the probability distribution of the outcomes as shown in [82].
3) Overcharging. It is shown in recent work [44] that smart
contracts can be overcharged due to the under-optimization of
smart contracts. These overcharged patterns have the features
like dead code, expensive operations in loops consisting of
repeated computations.
Recent advances for functional issues
• Re-entrancy: Recently, several proposals attempt to solve
some of the above challenges. Obsidian [38] was pro-
posed to address re-entrancy attacks and money leakage
problems. In particular, Obsidian exploits named states to
enable consistency checking on state transitions and ver-
ification so that re-entrancy vulnerability can be mended.
Moreover, a data flow analytical method was proposed
to prevent the illegal digital currency stealing from the
leakage. Ref. [39] proposed to eliminate re-entrancy
vulnerabilities by prohibiting the nesting calling among
functions in the contract. Liu et al. [40] proposed to
perform the fuzz testing on smart contracts by iteratively
generating random but diverse transactions to detect re-
entrancy bugs.
6Table III. Summary of challenges and advances in smart contracts
Phases Challenges Advances
Creation
• Recover source code [33]
1) Readability • Human readable code [34], [35]
• Human readable execution [36], [37]
• Re-entrancy [38], [39], [40]
2) Functional issues • Block randness [41], [42], [43]
• Overcharging [44], [45]
Deployment
• Bytecode analysis [46], [47], [48], [49], [50], [51], [52], [53]
1) Contract correctness • Source code analysis [54], [55], [56], [57]
• Machine learning based analysis [58], [59], [60]
• Graph based analysis [61], [62]
2) Dynamic control flow • Path-searching [63]
• Execution environment [64]
Execution
1) Trustworthy oracle
• Third-party involved [65]
• Decentralized [66], [67]
2) Transaction-ordering dependence
• Sequential execution [68]
• Predefining contract [69]
3) Execution efficiency
• Execution serialization [70], [71], [72]
• Inspection of contract [73]
Completion
1) Privacy and Security
• Privacy [74], [75]
• Security [76]
2) Scam
• Ponzi scheme [77] [22], [78]
• Honeypot [79]
• Block randness: Blockchain is regarded as a promising
technology to generate public and unpredictable random
values. However, the random output might not be so
random as people expect. Miners could control the block
generation and release the block until they find it prof-
itable. To address this issue, [41] proposed to use the
delay-function to generate randomness. It means that the
random value will be only be known to others after a
short time period since its generation. In this way, the
blockchain moves on and the miners could not withhold
their blocks to profit. But delay functions are not suitable
for smart contracts as most of they require instance
verification. To this end, [42] proposed the Sloth function
to allow faster verification. Based on [42], [43] proposed
a multi-round protocol to verify delay functions using a
refereed delegation model. It reduces the cost of verifying
the output from $30 to $0.4.
• Overcharging: Besides from caring the efficiency of their
programs, developers of smart contract also need to pay
attention to their execution costs. Ref. [44] reported
that over 90% of real smart contracts suffer from gas-
costly patterns in Ethereum. Chen et al. [45] proposed
GasReducer, a tool used to detect gas-costly patterns.
GasReducer can replace under-optimized bytecode with
efficient bytecode.
B. Deployment challenges
After creation, smart contracts will be deployed on
blockchain platforms. But smart contracts need to be checked
carefully to avoid potential bugs. Furthermore, smart contract
developers need to be aware of the contract’s interaction
patterns to mitigate potential losses due to the malicious be-
haviors (such as frauds and attacks [83]). We next describe the
challenges as well as advances in smart contract deployment.
1) Contract correctness: Once smart contracts have been
deployed on blockchains, it is nearly impossible to make any
revisions. Therefore, it is of vital importance to evaluate the
correctness of smart contracts before the formal deployment.
However, it is challenging to verify the correctness of smart
contracts due to the complexity of modelling smart contracts.
Recent advances for contract correctness
• Bytecode analysis: Bytecode level analysis only requires
the compiled bytecodes of smart contracts, which are
much easier to obtain. How to utilize these bytecode
to detect security threats has become a hot research
topic. In particular, OYENTE was proposed in [46] to
identify potential security bugs including mishandled
exceptions and timestamp-dependent problems. Based on
the control graph generated by OYENTE, [47] produces
the rule-based representations for high level bytecode
analysis. Meanwhile, Knecht and Stiller [48] proposed
a smart contract deployment and management platform
7(SmartDEMAP) to address the trust problem during the
contract development and deployment. Moreover, other
code quality control tools such as automated bug-finders
can also be equipped with SmartDEMAP. In this manner,
smart contracts can be deployed only after the trustful
conditions are fulfilled. Ref. [49] proposed MadMax to
predict gas-focus vulnerabilities in Ethereum smart con-
tracts. The combination of control-flow-analysis-based
decompiler and declarative program-structure queries en-
ables the method detecting the vulnerabilities in high
precision. Meanwhile [84] symbolically analyzed the
contract dependency graph to extract precise semantic
information from the code. Then, it checks compliance
and violation patterns that capture sufficient conditions
to prove if a property holds or not. Furthermore, [50]
proposed a method to search for certain critical paths in
the control flow graph of a smart contract and identify
paths that may lead to a critical instruction, where the
arguments of instructions can be controlled by an attacker.
Ref. [51] proposed Vandal, a tool which firstly converts
low level bytecode into register transfer language that
was then translated into logic semantic relations. In
addition, [52] proposed Gigahorse, a tool which is able to
decompile smart contract bytecode to high level 3-address
code representation. The new intermediate representation
of smart contracts makes the implicit data and control
flow dependencies of the EVM bytecode be explicit.
Amani et al. [53] reconstructed bytecode sequences into
blocks of straight-line code and created a program logic
to identify the security vulnerability of the contract.
• Source code analysis: Compared with bytecode level
analysis, source code analysis requires the availability
of smart contract source codes. Although the source
code analysis contains more information, it also requires
highly-precise analysis. There are a number of studies
on source code analysis of smart contracts. In particu-
lar, a formal verification method was proposed in [54]
to analyze and verify both the runtime safety and the
functional correctness of smart contracts (e.g., Ethereum
contracts). This method first translates smart contracts
into codes written in F* [55], which is a functional
programming language mainly used for program verifi-
cation. This translation can be used to detect abnormal
patterns like stack overflow (i.e., exceeding the stack
limit). Meanwhile, [56] proposed Zeus to verify the
correctness of smart contracts. Zeus firstly translates the
contracts and policy specification into low-level interme-
diate representation and feeds the encoded representation
into constrained horn clauses [57] to ascertain the safety
of the smart contract.
• Machine learning based analysis: Recently, machine
learning-based methods have been proposed to obtain a
better representation for detecting vulnerabilities in smart
contracts. In particular, [58] proposed a novel semantic-
aware security auditing technique called the S-gram
scheme for Ethereum. The S-gram scheme that com-
bines the N -gram language modeling and static semantic
labeling can be used to predict potential vulnerabilities
by identifying irregular token sequences and optimize
existing in-depth analyzers. Meanwhile, the work of [59]
translates the bytecode of smart contract into RGB color
that was transformed into images. The images were fed
into a convolutional neural network (CNN) to extract
more meaningful features. Moreover, [60] applied Long
Short Term Memory (LSTM) to analyze the security
threats of smart contracts at an opcode level.
2) Dynamic Control flow: Despite the fact that the deployed
smart contracts are immutable, the control flow of smart con-
tracts is not guaranteed to be immutable. In particular, a smart
contract can interact with other contracts (e.g., transferring
funds to the contract or creating a new contract). The control
flow of smart contract needs to be designed carefully when
developing the contract. The interaction of smart contracts
can result in an increased number of interconnected contracts
over time. Therefore, how to predict the contract behaviours
becomes challenging. In addition, most of existing methods
pay attention to the detection of potential dynamic control
flow problems in programs while the reliability of the ex-
ecution environment is not always ensured. Therefore, it is
also significant to check whether the execution environment is
reliable.
Recent advances for dynamic control flow
• Graph based analysis: Charlier et al. [61] proposed a
multi-dimensional approach to predict interactions among
smart contracts. In particular, this approach integrates
stochastic processes and tensors to reproduce existing
interactions, consequently predicting future contract inter-
actions. Furthermore, the work in [62] presents a heuristic
indicator of control flow immutability. In particular, this
approach was evaluated on a call graph of all smart
contracts on Ethereum. Through analyzing the call graph,
it is shown that two smart contracts (out of five) require
a trust in at least one third party.
• Path-searching: Nikolic´ et al. [63] proposed a method
namely MAIAN to detect vulnerabilities across a long
sequence of invocations of a contract. MAIAN employs
inter-procedural symbolic analysis and concrete validator
for exhibiting real exploits. It searches the spaces of
all execution paths in a trace with depth-first search
(DFS) and checks whether the contract triggers property
violation. Different from above graph-based methods,
MAIAN is designed to identify either locking funds
indefinitely, leakage to arbitrary users or being killed
by anyone. Therefore, it does not need to model the
interactions among smart contracts.
• Execution environment: EVMFuzz [64] was proposed
to detect vulnerabilities of the execution environment
of smart contract. EVMFuzz continuously generate seed
contracts for different EVM executions, so as to find as
many inconsistencies among execution results as possi-
ble. This method can eventually discover vulnerabilities
with cross-referencing outputs.
8C. Execution challenges
Execution phase is crucial to smart contracts as it determines
the final state of smart contracts. There are a number of issues
to be addressed during the execution of smart contracts.
1) Trustworthy oracle: Smart contracts cannot work with-
out real-world information. For example, an Eurobet (i.e., a
soccer betting smart contract) needs to know the result of
European Cup. However, a smart contract is designed to run
in a sandbox isolating from the outside network. In a smart
contract, an oracle plays a role of an agent who finds and
verifies real-world occurrences and forwards this information
to the smart contract. Thus, how to determine a trustworthy
oracle becomes a challenge.
Recent advances for trustworthy oracle
• Third-party involved: Town Crier (TC) [65] was proposed
to address this challenge. In particular, TC scrapes data
from reliable web sites and feeds those data to smart
contracts. TC feeds the data in the form of datagram
that is accompanied with the specific data-source web
site and a concrete time frame. Meanwhile, TC executes
its core functionality in a Software Guard Extension
(SGE) enclave that protects TC from attacks of malicious
behaviors.
• Decentralized: Ref. [66] proposed a decentralized oracle
named ASTRAEA, which is based on a voting game
among stake-holders. In particular, voters place a rea-
sonable amount of stakes to vote the random proposition
selected from the system. Once the weighted sum of votes
matches the vote from a voter, the voter will be rewarded,
otherwise, the voter will be penalized. Meanwhile, [67]
proposed a smart contract based solution for selecting
trustworthy oracles. A reputation contract is used to
record each oracle-service-provider’s reputation accord-
ing to its previous performance. Then an aggregating
contract will calculate the final results of a query from
users and finalize the result.
2) Transaction-ordering dependence: Users send transac-
tions to invoke functions in a smart contract while miners pack
the transactions into blocks. However, the order of transactions
is not deterministic due to the uncertainty of the bisected
blockchain branches [26]. This uncertainty can cause incon-
sistency of order-dependent transactions. For example, there
is a contract containing variant x. Alice sends a transaction
to increase x by 1 while Bob sends a transaction to multiply
x by 10. Due to uncertainty of the transaction order, the final
outcomes on variant x can either be x + 1 or x × 10. It is
worth mentioning that this inconsistency has been well solved
in conventional database management systems (DBMS) [85]
while it is challenging to solve it in smart contracts as far as
we know.
Recent advances for transaction-ordering dependence
• Sequential execution: Ref. [68] introduced a design pat-
tern of smart contract-transaction counter. Transaction
counter expects a transition number in each function as
a parameter and ensures the number be increased by
one after each function execution. Through analyzing the
transition number, the inconsistency problem is solved.
• Predefining contract: To avoid such anomaly, [69]
proposed to write smart contracts instead of trans-
actions. For example, if Alice wants to increase
the value of x after Bob’s operation, she writes a
IncreaseIfMultiplied() function, which avoids
the situation where Alice’s operation executes prior to
Bob’s.
3) Execution Efficiency: Smart contracts are serially exe-
cuted by miners. In other words, a miner will not execute
another contract until the current contract is completed. The
execution serialization essentially limits the system perfor-
mance. However, it is challenging to execute smart contracts
concurrently due to the shared data between multiple smart
contracts. In the meantime, how to inspect the contract data
without prescribed interface is also important to improving the
smart contract execution efficiency as it removes the need to
redeploy a new contract.
Recent advances for execution efficiency
• Execution serialization: To fill this gap, Dickerson et
al. [70] proposed an approach based on Software Trans-
actional Memory to allow miners or validators to execute
contracts in parallel. The main idea of this approach is to
treat each invocation of a smart contract as a speculative
atomic action. In this way, conflicts happened during the
parallel executions can be rolled back easily. Furthermore,
the work in [71] investigated smart contracts in a concur-
rent perspective. In particular, concurrency issues such
as atomicity, interference, synchronization, and resource
ownership have been well studied in this paper. Ref.
[72] proposed to use optimistic Software Transactional
Memory Systems to help improve the execution efficiency
of smart contracts. While executing contract transactions
concurrently using multi-threading, the miner also stores
a block graph of transactions into the block. Then the
validators re-execute the smart contract concurrently with
the given block graph. If the result is consistent, the block
will be appended into the blockchain.
• Inspection of contract: After deployment, the contract
content cannot be modified. What can developers do
if they are asked to observe some values that are not
described in their initial requirements? A straightforward
solution is to amend the smart contract and re-deploy
it. However, the redeployment of smart contracts may
cause additional costs. Ref. [73] proposed to exploit
the memory layout reification to decompile the binary
structure of a compiled contract. Meanwhile, the work of
[73] proposed the decompilation capabilities encapsulated
in mirrors [86], through which the method can introspect
the current state of a smart contract instance without
redeploying it.
D. Completion challenges
After the execution of smart contract, the modification to
the states in the system will be packed as a transaction and
broadcasted to each node. However, the proliferation of smart
contracts brings additional concerns.
91) Privacy and Security: Most current smart contract and
blockchain platforms lack of privacy-preserving mechanisms,
especially for transactional privacy. In particular, the transac-
tion records (i.e., the sequence of operations) are disseminated
throughout the whole blockchain networks. Consequently, all
the transactions are visible to everyone in the networks. Al-
though some blockchain systems utilize pseudonymous public
keys to improve the anonymity of the transactions, most
transaction data (such as balances) are still publicly visible.
As shown in [87], it is possible to obtain useful information
from the transaction data based on the transactional graph
analysis. smart contract systems also have their inherent
software vulnerabilities, which are susceptible to malicious
attacks. In addition, smart contracts run on top of blockchain
systems which are also suffering from system vulnerability.
For example, it is reported in [88] that attackers exploited
Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) routing scheme to intercept
messages in blockchains. It can cause high delay of message
broadcasting and also hijack the traffic of a subset of nodes,
thereby stealing digital currency.
Recent advances for privacy and security
• Privacy: To address the privacy concerns of smart con-
tracts, Kosba et al. [74] proposed Hawk - a decentral-
ized smart contract system to establish privacy-preserved
smart contracts. In particular, the Hawk compiler will
compile a contract into a cryptographic protocol auto-
matically. The compiled Hawk program contains two
major parts: a private portion used to execute the major
function and a public portion used to protect users. Hawk
will encrypt the transaction information (e.g., transaction
balance) and verify the correctness of transactions via
using zero-knowledge proofs (i.e., without viewing the
content of the transactions). The anonymity of the parties
in smart contracts can be ensured while the secrecy of
contract execution may not be fulfilled. Enigma [75]
offers a solution to the secrecy of smart contract ex-
ecution. Advanced cartographic algorithms are used in
Enigma to support zero-knowledge proofs. Moreover,
Enigma distributes blockchain data in different nodes
unlike traditional blockchain redundant schemes (i.e.,
every node saves a copy of all transactions).
• Security: There are some efforts in solving the security
concerns. For example, the recent work of [76] pro-
poses a secure relaying-network for blockchains, namely
SABRE. In particular, SABRE adjusts the inter-domain
routing policies for BGP routing scheme. It can protect
the link between clients and relays via placing relays
appropriately. Meanwhile, SABRE also adopts the co-
design of hardware and software via software defined
networking (SDN) to reduce the traffic burden at re-
lays. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness
against BGP routing attacks.
2) Scams: As a new technology, blockchain and smart con-
tracts are vulnerable to malicious attacks initiated by scams.
The detection of scams is of great importance especially
for contract users since it enables them to terminate their
contract Multiplicator {
...
function multiplicate(address receiver)
payable {
if (msg.value >= this.balance)
{receiver.transfer(this.balance+msg.value);}
}
Figure 4. Example of smart contract honeypot [79]
investments at an early phase to avoid the unnecessary loss.
Recent advances for readability challenge
• Ponzi scheme: Ponzi scheme is a classical fraud which
promises high return rates with little risk to investors.
It pays the older investors with new investors’ funds.
But if there is no enough circulating money, the scheme
unravels those posteriors who consequently lose their
money. The recent work of [77] conducted a systematic
study over the Ponzi schemes on Ethereum. In particular,
16,082,269 transactions were collected from July, 2015
to May, 2017. It was found that 17,777 transactions were
related to Ponzi schemes, which had already collected
over 410,000 US dollars within only two years. Chen
et al. [22] proposed a method to extract features from
both accounts and the operation codes to identify Ponzi
schemes on Ethereum. Meanwhile, the work of [78]
proposed a novel approach to detect and quantify Ponzi
schemes on Bitcoin. In particular, to address the difficulty
of identifying Ponzi schemes as they often use multiple
addresses, a clustering method [78] was proposed to
identify the addresses. They found that 19 out of 32 Ponzi
schemes use more than one addresses.
• Honeypot: Smart contract Honeypot implies that the
vulnerable-looking contracts contain hidden traps. Take
Figure 4 as an example. At the first glance, a naive
user may believe that the contract will automatically
return the total amount of current balance plus extra
money after he or she sends the money to this contract.
However, the balance will increase prior to the function
execution and the condition of if (msg.value >=
this.balance) will never be satisfied. The work of
[79] developed a taxonomy of honeypot techniques and
use symbolic execution and heuristics to detect honeypots
in smart contracts. In addition, [79] found that the honey-
pot contracts have made over $90,000 profit for creators.
IV. SMART CONTRACT DEVELOPMENT PLATFORMS
Recently, smart contracts have been developed on block-
chain-based platforms. These platforms provide developers
with simple interfaces to build smart contract applications.
Among a number of incumbent blockchain platforms, many of
them can support smart contracts. In this paper, we introduce
5 most representative smart contract platforms: Ethereum [89],
Hyperledger Fabric [90], Corda [91], Stellar [92], Rootstock
10
[93] in Section IV-A. We choose them mainly due the popular-
ity in developing community and technical maturity as implied
in [94]. We next summarize the common features of them in
Section IV-B. Finally, we give an example of developing a
smart contract in Section IV-C.
A. Representative platforms
1) Ethereum: Ethereum is a decentralized platform that
can execute smart contracts. In contrast to Bitcoin’s Turing-
incomplete script system, Ethereum has developed Turing-
complete languages such as Solidity2, Serpent3, Low-level
Lisp-like Language (LLL)4 and Mutan5 to support general user
applications beyond cyptocurrency applications. Ethereum
compiles smart contracts written by Solidity, Serpent, LLL
and Mutan into machine codes, which will then be loaded to
EVM and run. Meanwhile, Ethereum adopts the account-based
data model, in which each participant is identified by its digital
wallet.
Similar to Bitcoin, Ethereum adopts PoW as the consensus
algorithm, which is also computational intensive. To com-
pensate the cost of solving puzzles done by miners, Ether
(ETH) instead of coins (BTC) in Bitcoin is used. Essentially,
gas serves as an internal price for executing a transaction to
overcome the unstable value of ETH. Informally, the total cost
of a transaction can be calculated by gas limit × gas price,
where gas limit denotes the maximum amount of gas to be
used to generate a block and gas price is the cost of a unit
of gas (in ETH). Users can pay different amounts of gas to
let their transactions be confirmed earlier or later (i.e., large
amount of gas resulting in the fast confirmation). Since PoW is
computationally intensive, it can waste a number of electricity
for meaningless block mining tasks. It is expected if the mining
process is used for meaningful events, such as help solving
mathematical puzzles and conducting machine learning tasks.
2) Hyperledger Fabric: Hyperledger Fabric is also a dis-
tributed ledger platform for running smart contracts [90].
Different from Ethereum who runs smart contacts in virtual
machines (i.e., EVM), Hyperledger adopts Docker container
to execute the code. In contrast to virtual machines (VMs),
containers can support smart contract applications with lower
overhead while sacrificing the isolation (i.e., applications in
one container are running on top of one operating system).
Instead of developing smart contract languages of Etherum,
Fabric supports conventional high-level programming lan-
guages such as Java and Go (aka Golang). Similarly, Fabric is
also Turing complete. Fabric adopts key-value pair as the data
model.
As Fabric is designed to support general enterprise applica-
tions, the Fabric blockchain-network is permissioned (private
or consortium). Users have to be authorized to join the network
by certificate authorities (CAs). Since there are different roles
in the network, multiple types of CAs coexist. For instance, the
enrollment certificate authority (ECA) allows users to register
2https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/develop/
3https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Serpent
4https://lll-docs.readthedocs.io/en/latest/lll introduction.html
5https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/wiki
with blockchains. Once the user has registered, he/she has
to request transaction certificates from transaction certificate
authority (TCA). The consensus can be easily reached within
the permissioned blockchain-network. Fabric exploits PBFT
which requires the multi-round voting among authenticated
users. PBFT relies on multi-round communications among
nodes, which can cause time delay. More efficient consensus
algorithms should be developed to resolve this problem.
3) Corda: In contrast to diverse applications of Ethereum,
Corda [91] is specialized for digital-currency applications.
It serves as a distributed-ledger platform for saving and
processing historical digital-asset records. Corda adopts high-
level programming languages such as Java and Kotlin6, which
are running on top of Java Virtual Machine (JVM). Mean-
while, Corda is Turing incomplete to support the verifiability.
Moreover, the data model in Corda is the transaction-based
model.
Corda typically supports private platforms, in which en-
terprises establish an authored network to exchange digital-
assets in the private manner. In private blockchain platforms,
the consensus can easily reach. Corda adopts Raft [95] as the
consensus algorithm. The consensus in Raft can be achieved
by selecting a leader, log replication and safety assurance.
Instead of globally broadcasting in blockchains, Corda uses the
point-to-point messaging mechanism. Users have to specify
the message receivers and the detailed information to be sent.
4) Stellar: Similar to Corda, Stellar [92] is a specialized
platform for digital-currency applications. Compared with
Ethereum, Stellar is simpler and more accessible. Meanwhile,
Stellar can support a diversity of languages such as Python,
JavaScript, Golang and PHP. However, Stellar contracts are not
Turing complete. Similar to Fabric, Stellar executes program
codes on top of Docker containers, consequently reducing the
overhead. For example, the execution cost of one transac-
tion at Stellar is only ∼$0.0000002, which can almost be
ignored. Moreover, the execution time for one transaction
in Stellar is about 5 seconds on average in contrast to 3.5
minutes in Ethereum. Therefore, Stellar is an ideal platform
for digital-currency applications. Like Ethereum, Stellar adopts
the account-based model as the data model. Stellar developed
its own consensus algorithm - Stellar Consensus Protocol
(SCP) [92]. Since Stellar is permissioned, the consensus can
be easily reached via SCP.
5) Rootstock: Rootstock (RSK) [93] runs on top of Bitcoin
while supporting faster execution of transactions. For example,
RSK can confirm the executed transaction within 20 seconds.
Meanwhile, RSK is compatible with Ethereum (e.g., adopting
Solidity to implement contracts). RSK contracts are also
Turing complete7. Furthermore, RSK developed its own virtual
machines to run smart contracts. The data model of RSK is
also account-based while RSK is a public blockchain system.
RSK developed its consensus scheme based on PoW while
it adopts lightweight implementation consequently reducing
the overhead. Like Corda and Stellar, RSK was proposed to
mainly support digital-currency applications. RSK has a merit,
6https://kotlinlang.org/
7Bitcoin is not Turing complete while Rootstock is Turing complete.
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Table IV. Comparison of Smart Contract Platforms
Ethereum Fabric Corda Stellar Rootstock EOS
Execution
environment
EVM Docker JVM Docker VM WebAssembly
Language Solidity, Serpent,
LLL, Mutan
Java, Golang Java, Kotlin Python, JavaScript,
Golang and PHP,
etc.
Solidity C++
Turing Completeness Turing complete Turing complete Turing incomplete Turing incomplete Turing complete Turing complete
Data model Account-based Key-value pair Transaction-based Account-based Account-based Account-based
Consensus PoW PBFT Raft Stellar Consensus
Protocol (SCP)
PoW BFT-DPOS
Permission Public Private Private Consortium Public Public
Application General General Digital currency Digital currency Digital currency General
i.e., much safer than those systems independent of blockchains
since it runs on top of Bitcoin. However, it can cause extra
burden on Bitcoin blockchain. How to resolve this problem is
crucial to RSK.
6) EOS: EOS [96] is designed to enable the scalability of
decentralized applications. Instead of using one type of con-
sensus algorithms only, EOS combines Byzantine Fault Toler-
ance (BFT) and Delegated Proof of Stake (DPOS), thereby
obtaining the advantages of both consensus algorithms. At
each round, delegates (i.e., block producers) will be selected
by stake holders to produce a new block and BFT will proceed
among those selected delegates to make the block irreversible.
Similar to Bitcoin, EOS is also account-based but it also
allows all accounts to be referenced by human readable names.
Instead of customizing a virtual machine for code execution
like Ethereum, EOS chooses to use WebAssembly (Wasm) so
that it is possible to write a smart contract in various languages
as long as it can be compiled into Wasm (e.g., EOS supports
C++).
B. Comparison of Smart Contract Platforms
Table IV compares Ethereum, Fabric, Corda, Stella, Root-
stock (RSK) and EOS from the following aspects such as
execution environment, supporting language, Turing com-
pleteness, data model, consensus protocols, permission and
application. We next summarize the main characteristics of
these representative smart contract platforms as follows.
• Execution Environment. Contracts in Ethereum are ex-
ecuted in EVM. Similarly, Corda and Rootstock adopt
JVM and RSK virtual machines, respectively. In contrast,
Fabric and Stellar run smart contracts on top of Docker
containers, consequently reducing the overhead while
sacrificing the isolation of applications. EOS chooses to
use Wasm to support more smart contract languages.
• Supported Languages. Ethereum supports Solidity, Ser-
pent and Mutan, which are specially designed for
Ethereum. Fabric currently supports Java and Golang
while Corda adopts Java and Kotlin. Stellar can support a
diversity of languages such as Python, Javascript, Golang
and PHP. To be compatible with Ethereum, RSK adopts
Solidity as the contract language while EOS currently
only supports C++.
• Turing completeness. Smart contracts on Ethereum, EOS,
Fabric and RSK are all Turing complete while Corda and
Stellar are Turing incomplete. Turing-complete contracts
are typically more expressive than Turing-incomplete
contracts. However, the Turing completeness also brings
the potential software bugs being susceptible to malicious
attacks (as illustrated in Section III).
• Data Model. Corda adopts the unspent transaction output
(UTXO) model as Bitcoin does. In UTXO model, each
payment has to specify the previous unspent transaction
as the input. Then the specified transaction becomes
spent. The changes will be made on new unspent trans-
actions. Ethereum, Stellar, EOS and RSK adopt account-
based model, in which the balance of an address is
recorded directly instead of calculating all the unspent
transaction amounts. Fabric exploits key-value model, in
which data is represented in key-value pairs stored in
blockchains.
• Consensus Algorithms. Ethereum and RSK adopt PoW,
in which the validation of the trustfulness of a block
is equivalent to the solution of a computationally diffi-
cult problem (i.e., a puzzle). PoW consensus algorithms
are typically computational-intensive. Fabric chooses to
PBFT consensus algorithm [24], in which several rounds
of voting among authenticated nodes are taken to reach
the consensus. Therefore, PBFT is network-intensive.
In contrast, Corda adopts a simple consensus algorithm
namely Raft to achieve the consensus between different
sectors at the level of individual deals instead of a global
system. Similarly, Stellar develops a simply consensus
algorithm named SCP to reach the consensus. EOS uses
the combination of BFT and DPOS.
• Permission. Ethereum, EOS and RSK are public
(i.e.permissionless) smart contract platforms and each
user can arbitrarily join the network while Corda and
Hyperledger are private platforms only allowing authen-
ticated users to access. Stellar sitting between public and
private blockchains is a consortium blockchain across
different enterprise sectors (or organizations).
• Applications of smart contract. Unlike Corda, Stellar and
RSK only support digital-currency while Ethereum and
Fabric cater for a wider diversity of applications ranging
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Figure 5. Workflow of a smart contract
from digital currency, digital-asset management, capital
investment, public sector to sharing economy. In the
future, Corda, EOS, Stellar and RSK and their derivatives
may support more general applications.
C. Example of developing a smart contract
We next show how to develop and deploy a smart contract.
Take a contract of money transfer between Alice and Bob as
an example as shown in Figure 5. After several rounds of
negotiations, the agreement between Alice and Bob reaches.
Then the agreement is implemented by a smart contract
language (e.g., Solidity in Ethereum and Golang in Fabric).
The smart contract code is next compiled via a compiler (e.g.,
solc for Solidity), which generates machine code (or bytecode)
running on top of either virtual machines (e.g., EVM, JVM) or
Docker containers at a smart contract client. The smart contract
client is essentially connected through a peer-to-peer network.
After the smart contract is deployed across the blockchain
network, a unique contract address is returned to the client to
support the future interactions. Thereafter, users can interact
with the blockchain network via executing transactions in the
smart contract (e.g., deducting the specified amount of money
from Alice’s digital wallet and increasing the corresponding
// mortal.sol
pragma solidity ˆ0.4.0;
contract mortal {
/* Define variable owner of the type address
*/
address owner;
/* This function is executed at
initialization */
constructor() internal { owner =
msg.sender; }
/* Function to send 500 wei to receiver’s
address; 10ˆ18 wei=1 ether; */
function fundtransfer(address receiver)
public { if (msg.sender == owner)
{receiver.transfer(500);} }
}
Figure 6. Example of smart contract written in Solidity in
Ethereum
amount of money in Bob’s wallet). It is worth mentioning that
each transaction needs to be validated across the blockchain
network via the consensus algorithms as shown in Figure
5. The validated transaction is then appended to the list of
transactions. Since every node has a copy of the updated
blockchain, it is difficulty to falsify the blockchain data.
Coding Sample. The syntax of Solidity is similar to
JavaScript and it also supports inheritance and user-defined
types. Figure 6 shows an example of a smart contract written
in Solidity.
V. APPLICATIONS OF SMART CONTRACT
Smart contracts have a broad spectrum of applications rang-
ing from Internet of Things to sharing economy. In particular,
we roughly categorize major smart contract applications into
six types as shown in Figure 7. We next describe them in
details.
A. Internet of Things
Internet of things (IoT) that is one of the most promising
technologies can support numerous applications including
supply chain management, inventory control systems, retailers,
access control, libraries, e-health systems, industrial Internet
[97], [98], [99]. The main initiative of IoT is to integrate
“smart” objects (i.e., “things”) into the Internet and to provide
various services to users [100]. IoT has been proposed to
automate various business transactions in an implicit way.
With the integration with smart contracts, the potentials
of IoT can be unleashed. Take industrial manufacturing as
an example. Most current manufacturers maintain their IoT
ecosystems in a centralized manner. For instance, firmware
updates can only be obtained at the central server manually
by various IoT devices through querying from devices to
the server. Smart contracts offer an automatic solution to
this problem [101]. Manufacturers can place firmware update
hashes on smart contracts deployed on blockchains distributed
throughout the whole network. Devices can then obtain the
firmware hashes from smart contracts automatically. In this
way, resources are greatly saved.
Smart contracts can also bring benefits to IoT e-business
model. For example, the traditional e-business model often
requires a third party serving as an agent to complete the pay-
ment. However, this centralized payment is costly and cannot
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fully utilize advantages of IoT. In [4], Distributed autonomous
Corporations (DACs) were proposed to automate transactions,
in which there are no traditional roles like governments or
companies involved with the payment. Being implemented by
smart contracts, DACs can work automatically without human
intervention. Moreover, smart contracts can also help to speed
up conventional supply chains. For example, the marriage of
supply chains with smart contracts can automate contractual
rights and obligations during the payment and the delivery of
goods while all the parties in the whole process are trustful.
B. Distributed system security
Smart contracts can bring benefits in improving the security
of distributed systems. Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS)
attacks are one of major security threats in computer networks.
Attackers flood the targeted machine with superfluous requests
to overload systems, consequently interrupting or suspending
Internet services [102]. Recently, a collaborative mechanism
was proposed to mitigate DDoS attacks [103]. Compared
with traditional solutions, this scheme that is based on smart
contracts can tackle the attacks in a fully decentralized manner.
In particular, once a server is attacked, the IP addresses of
attackers will be automatically stored in a smart contract. In
this manner, other nodes will be informed of the addresses of
attackers. Furthermore, other security polices will be imme-
diately enforced, e.g., filtering the traffic from the malicious
users.
Cloud computing is a promising technology to offer a
ubiquitous access of a shared pool of computing and stor-
age resources to users [104]. Generally, users can purchase
cloud services from trustful cloud service providers (CSPs).
However, how to verify the trustfulness of CSPs becomes a
challenge since CSPs often collude with each other to earn
more profits. Dong et al. [105] proposed a solution based
on game theory and smart contracts. The main idea of this
approach is to let a client ask two cloud servers to compute
the same task. During this process, smart contracts are used
to stimulate tension, betrayal and distrust between the clouds.
In this way, users can easily determine the rational clouds that
will not collude and cheat. Experiments based on the contracts
written in Solidity on the official Ethereum network were also
conducted to verify the effectiveness of this proposal.
Moreover, brokers are typically used in cloud comput-
ing. Users’ requests are checked by a broker to match
with providers’ services. However, both users and service
providers must trust the broker. Once the broker is hijacked
or compromised, both the parties become untrustful. Recently,
Scoca et al. [9] proposed to use smart contracts to avoid
the usage of brokers. The main idea of their approach is to
use distributed Service-Level-Agreements for Clouds (dSLAC)
[106] to specify the needs via smart contracts. Meanwhile, a
utility function that evaluates the agreements according to both
parties’ preferences was proposed to solve the mismatching
problem.
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C. Finance
Smart contracts can potentially reduce financial risks, cut
down administration and service costs and improve the effi-
ciency of financial services. We next explain the benefits of
smart contracts in the following typical financial services.
• Capital markets and investment banking. The traditional
capital markets have suffered from the long settlement
cycles. Smart contracts can significantly shorten the set-
tlement period from 20 days or more to 6 to 10 days
consequently increasing attractiveness to customers. As
a result, it is predicted in [107] that it can bring 5% to
6% demand growth in the future and lead to additional
income.
• Commercial and retail banking. In additional to capi-
tal markets, the adoption of smart contracts can also
bring benefits to the mortgage loan industry [108]. Con-
ventional mortgage loans are typically complicated in
the origination, funding and servicing processes, conse-
quently causing extra costs and delays. Smart contracts
can potentially reduce the costs and the delays through
automating the mortgage processes with the digitization
of legal documents in blockchains.
• Insurance. The application of smart contracts in the insur-
ance industry can also reduce the processing overheads
and save the costs especially in claim handling [109].
Take the motor insurance as an example. There are
multiple parties in a motor insurance: insurer, customers,
garages, transport providers and hospitals [110]. Smart
contracts can automate the settlement of claims by shar-
ing legal documents in the distributed ledger consequently
improving the efficiency, reducing the claim processing
time and saving costs. For another example, the insurance
gaint AXA has launched its insurance for flight delay
based on Ethereum smart contracts. Passengers who
purchase flight insurances will automatically sign a smart
contract, which connects to the global air traffic database.
If the system notices a flight delay of over two hours,
it will trigger a function in the smart contract, thereby
passengers being paid immediately.
D. Data provenance
In addition to financial services, smart contracts can also
be used to ensure information quality in scientific research
and public health. It is reported in [111] that fabrication or
falsification of data in clinical trials have occurred frequently
in recent years. For another example, one paper published
in Nature in 2009 was reported to contain fraud data con-
ducted by Haruko Obokata [112]. The fabricated data can
either mislead the ongoing research directions or hamper the
recovery of patients. Consequently, it can seriously undermine
the scientific and public trust.
Data provenance has been subsequently proposed to mit-
igate this problem. The main idea of data provenance is to
store the meta-data information of data origin, derivation and
transformation. However, there are a number of challenges
in enforcing data provenance. For example, most provenance
logging tools such as Progger [113] and Trusted Platform
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Module (TPM) [114] store data activities along with privacy-
sensitive information (e.g., user ID, accessing time and user
roles). How to preserve the privacy information is a chal-
lenge. Ramachandran and Kantarcioglu [115] proposed a data
provenance system based on smart contracts and blockchains.
Researchers can submit their encrypted data to this system.
When there are any data changes, smart contracts will be
invoked to track the transformations made to the data. In this
manner, any malicious falsifications of data can be captured.
In addition, Liang et al. [116] proposed ProvChain to collect
and verify cloud data provenance. The main idea of ProvChain
is to embed provenance data into blockchain transactions so
that any data modifications are traceable. ProvChain consists
of three procedures: provenance data collection, provenance
data storage and provenance data validation. Experimental
results demonstrate that ProvChain offers tamper-proof data
provenance, privacy-preservation and data reliability.
Moreover, smart contract can be used to protect intellectual
property of creative digital media. For example, Figure 8
shows an example of this application. Each digital product
is embedded with a unique digital watermark (such as buyer’s
digital wallet address and product ID). If there is any infringe-
ment (e.g., the buyer sells the digital product to others without
the permission from the creator), the law enforcement officer
can trace the illegal file with the original file via extracting
the digital watermark and comparing the digital wallet address
with buyer’s. As a result, the infringement of property-right
can be easily identified. The whole procedure can be achieved
through smart contracts and blockchains.
E. Sharing economy
The sharing economy brings many benefits such as reducing
consumer costs by borrowing and recycling items, improving
resource usage, enhancing quality of service, lowering the
environment impacts [119]. However, most current sharing
economy platforms are suffering from high transaction costs
of customers, privacy exposure and unreliability of trusted
third parties due to the centralization. Smart contracts can
potentially reshape sharing economy by decentralizing sharing
economy platforms.
Bogner et al. [3] proposed a novel sharing economy plat-
form based on Ethereum smart contracts. In particular, this
system allows users to register and share their items without
a trusted third party. Meanwhile, personal information is also
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Table V. Comparison of smart contract applications
Application Benefits Use Cases
Internet of Things [101], [4]
XReducing the cost for maintaining central server (1) IoT device firmware auto-updating
XAutomating P2P business trading (2) Supply chains speeding up
XReducing cost for trusted third parties
Distributed Systems Security
[103], [105], [9]
XSharing attack list quickly and reliably (1) Mitigating DDoS attack in computer networks
XVerifying the trustfulness of cloud service providers (2) Cloud computing
XAvoiding usage of brokers
Finance [107], [108], [109]
XReducing financial risks (1) Capital markets and investment banking
XLowering administration and service costs (2) Commercial and retail banking
XImproving efficiency of financial services (3) Insurance
Data Provenance [115], [116]
XCapturing malicious data falsification (1) Scientific research
XImproving data reliability (2) Public health
XPreserving privacy (3) Cloud data provenance
Sharing Economy [3], [117],
[118]
XReducing consumer costs (1) Item sharing
XReducing cost for trusted third parties (2) P2P automatic payment systems
XPreserving privacy (3) Currency exchange platforms
Public sector [5], [8], [7]
XPreventing data fraudulence (1) E-voting systems
XData transparency of public information (2) Personal reputation systems
XPreserving privacy (3) Smart property exchange platforms
privacy-preserved. The practical implementation also verifies
the effectiveness of the system. In addition, the fusion of
Internet of Things (IoT) and smart contracts can also advance
sharing economy applications. Huckle et al. [117] discussed
the integration of IoT with blockchains to develop sharing
economy applications such as peer-to-peer automatic payment
systems, traveling systems, digital assets management and
currency exchange platforms.
Meanwhile, a privacy respecting approach was proposed
in [118] for blockchain-based sharing economy applications.
This scheme mainly solves the privacy leakage problem of
blockchain-based systems due to the public openness of
blockchains. In particular, a zero-knowledge approach was
applied to this system. Realistic implementation also demon-
strates the effectiveness of the proposed mechanism.
F. Public sector
Smart contracts along with blockchain technology are also
reshaping the public sector management. Blockchain can es-
sentially prevent data fraudulence and provide the transparency
of public information. Take a public bidding as an example.
The integration of blockchains and smart contracts can prove
identities of both bidders and bidding entities, automate the
bidding process, provide auditing and reviewing supports.
There are several challenges in e-voting systems, such as
user identity verification and user privacy preservation (or
voting anonymity). Smart contracts also offer the solution to
e-voting systems. A blockchain-based voting system named
Follow My Vote8 was proposed to verify user identities without
8Follow My Vote https://followmyvote.com/
the disclosure of user privacy. However, it still relies on a
trusted third authority to shuffle the voters so as not to reveal
user privacy. McCorry et al. [5] utilized the knowledge of
self-tallying voting protocols (i.e., voters can count the votes
without a trusted third party) to build a fair voting system
based on smart contracts. In this way, votes can be kept
privately while user identities are verifiable at the same time.
Smart contracts can also be used to establish personal digital
identity and reputation. For example, Tsinghua University
User Reputation System (TURS) [8] is an online identity
management system based on smart contracts. The TURS
profile of a person is based on three aspects: personal reputa-
tion, online reputation and professional reputation. Users can
protect their private information via smart contracts that grant
access permissions to other users by programmable clauses
(statements). Meanwhile, all the transactions that are recorded
into blockchains cannot be tampered with or removed.
Hillbom and Tillstro¨m [7] proposed a smart property own-
ership exchange protocol based on the smart property con-
cept firstly proposed by Szabo [120]. In this protocol, each
party in the transaction communicates with each other via
Bitmessage [121]. After the negotiation of the trading details
(e.g., a car’s digital certificate issued by its manufacturer), the
buyer constructs and signs a raw transaction that reassigns
the property ownership to the buyer himself/herself. After
the signed transaction is sent to the seller, the seller then
checks the transaction information. If it is correct, the seller
signs on the received transaction and broadcasts it publicly.
Moreover, to ensure the consistency, the whole ownership
transfer process has to be conducted in an atomic way. In
other words, any failure during the whole process will abort
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the whole ownership transfer process. For example, if the seller
does not sign the transaction, he/she will not get the funds from
the buyer. Moreover, Li et al. [122] proposed a secure energy
trading system based on consortium blockchain technology.
In particular, a credit-based payment scheme was proposed to
support fast energy trading without a trusted intermediary.
Summary. Table V compares the smart contract applications.
As shown in Table V, smart contracts can bring numerous
benefits for the aforementioned applications. In summary,
smart contracts have the merits like reducing the dependence
on the trusted third parties, lowering the cost, improving the
data reliability and offering privacy-preservation.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article presents an overview on the state-of-the-art of
smart contracts. In particular, we first provide a brief review
on smart contract and blockchain technologies. We then point
out the challenges in smart contracts in different aspects of
creation, deployment, execution, completion of smart con-
tracts. Meanwhile, we also discuss the recent advances in
solving these challenges. We next compare several major smart
contract platforms. Moreover, we categorize smart contract
applications and enumerate several typical use cases in each
category of applications. In summary, we hope this paper
will serve as a guidance to developing secure and scalable
smart contract applications and promote the evolvement of
blockchain technologies.
On top of blockchains, smart contract is developing rapidly
albeit there are still a number of challenges to be addressed.
Most of current research topics on smart contract focus on
programming language, security and privacy issues while the
proliferation of blockchain and smart contract applications also
poses new challenges. Like other computer software tools,
smart contracts also contain a number of bugs which are gen-
erated unintentionally or mischievously. However, detecting
and identifying these bugs will require extensive efforts in
aspects of software engineering and data analytics. In addition,
although enterprise practitioners lack of knowledge in com-
puting programming, they have the expertise in operational
technology and law making (i.e., making contracts), which
however is the deficiency of computer programmers. How to
fill the gap between operational technology (OT) and informa-
tion technology (IT) is of great importance to the development
of smart contracts. The integration of software technology,
natural language processing and artificial intelligence is a
possible remedy to this challenge in the future.
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